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The purpose of this thesis was to explore the steps and conditions which are necessary to 
implement a successful privatization plans, and to review privatization impact on firms’ 
performance. The focus of this study will be on privatization in developing countries, and 
the impact that privatization has on firms operating in those countries. The theoretical part 
of this study will provide few definitions for privatization, and it will clarify its common 
requirements and methods. The empirical part of this study was conducted by using a 
qualitative research method. The results were based on one interview, and on three major 
international studies. The interview questions were regarding the prerequisites and steps 
required to implement a successful privatization program, while the studies used were re-
garding newly privatized firms performance in developing countries. The aim of this 
study was to find out what should be done to manage a successful privatization campaign 
in a certain developing country, and what impacts does privatization have on the perfor-
mance of firms in general. The findings of this research showed a positive impact of pri-
vatization over firms’ performance, and at the same time the research clarified the major 
and the most important steps which are required to implement privatization plans in a 
successful manner. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: 
 
Privatization has been considered by many as a magic tool to generate revenue for 
governments, and to increase efficiency and productivity for state owned enterprises. 
starting at the beginning of 80’s, privatization has become a global phenomenon and the 
pace of privatization has accelerated during the 90’s to reach its peak at the beginning of 
the current century before it slows down drastically after 2001. Despite facing a fierce 
opposition in the beginning, privatization's experience was generally considered 
successful, particularly in developed nations. On the other hand, the experience of 
privatization in many developing countries and transition economies was not so 
colorful, where the selling of state owned enterprises (SOE) did not yield its hoped 
results. Despite the developing countries experience with privatization, many scholars 
insisted that selling of SOEs in developing countries could improve their performance. 
A vast sum of literatures has been published around this topic; quite many of these 
literatures identified the ways and the conditions for a successful privatization by 
referring to some examples in industrial countries, while other scholars studied 
privatization impacts on newly privatized firms. To explore the correct path for 
successful privatization, this study is aiming at identifying these ways and conditions 
for a successful privatization campaign. In addition to identifying the correct path, this 
study will review the impacts of privatization over firm’s performance in developing 
countries.  Based on this information the research questions for this study are: 
1. What are the steps that can be taken and the conditions that should exist in 
order to insure the success of privatization? 
2. What are the impacts of privatization on firms in developing countries? 
 
1.1 Description of materials 
This study will be divided into three major parts, the Theory part, the Empirical part, 
and the Results and Findings part.  In the theory part the author will go through the 
following topics: 
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1. The history of the state’s role in developing countries, and a review of the 
advantages and disadvantages of both state owned and private owned 
enterprises. 
2. The history of privatization and its experience around the world. 
3. The reasons behind privatization's decision and the steps and methods which are 
normally used to implement it. 
 
1.2 Methodology: 
The empirical part of this study will be divided in to two parts; the first part is the 
interview with an expert. The expert will be answering questions regarding privatization 
conditions and prerequisites and the steps which are necessary to ensure positive effects. 
The second part will be referring to three major international studies regarding 
privatization impacts on firms. The author will focus on the impact of privatization over 
firms operating in developing countries. Both the interview and the international studies 
will be analyzed to answer the research questions of this study. 
 
1.3 Limitation of the study 
This study will be conducted over developing countries in general, and the findings are 
quite general and may not be suitable for a particular country or firm and due the fact 
that each country has its own history and culture, suitable privatization conditions and 
practices may vary between countries. Another point of restriction is that the 
international studies which are used as empirical evidence in this study has been 
conducted between the years 1994-1999 and the information and data which have been 
used are relatively old. 
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2 THEORY  
 
2.1 State's role in developing countries 
 
The state's role in leading the economy in developing countries has reached its peak 
during the 60's of the last century, but this role started to shrink one decade later at the 
end of 70's. On the other hand, privatization had gained popularity during the 80's and 
reached its peak at the beginning of the current century with an increasing role for the 
multinational corporations and globalization.  (Al-Roubaiee, 2003) This shifting of roles 
in leading the economy between the state and the private sector was related mainly to 
the influence of the advance economies over the financial policies in developing 
countries. In addition to the advance economies influence, global and regional economic 
and financial policies inspired certain policies within developing countries, and this is 
considered as the main factor behind transferring the state's role from active to a more 
neutral role.  (Al-Roubaiee, 2003) Even though domestic pressure for a major reform in 
the economy was pervasive in developing countries, the external economic and political 
pressures which have been practiced by developed nations over developing countries 
have shaped the form of reform or policy that these developing countries have adopted. 
The period when some current advanced economies lunched a reform plans and 
prepared the proper atmosphere towards economic development, is considered by many 
developing countries as the most important period to take lessons from, because it is in 
that period when the role of the state was crucial, and when the state's role towards 
reaching economic development, and towards protecting the national economy, was to 
support and help the capitalist class to push the economic cycle forward. (Al-Roubaiee, 
2003). However it is important to note that economic policies are not suitable for all 
countries with the same level. Each country went through different economical and 
political circumstances and each society has reached a certain level of development that 
may not be well prepared for a certain economic policy, and the application of such a 
policy might results in disastrous impacts on the economy and on the society as a 
whole, despite the fact that the same policy considered successful in some other 
economies.  (Al-Roubaiee, 2003)According to Mohyeldien (1975), the intervening role 
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of the state in leading the economy and in determining the size of private sector's role is 
shaped by two major factors: 
 Domestic factor related to the complex task faced by the newly independent 
states after World War II, of how to deal with structural imbalances, and in 
particular the imbalance of the relationship between the human and material 
resources and production structure, and the consequent need to define the 
ways and conditions to move towards development. 
 External factor related to the intensity of international tension between the 
countries of the capitalist West camp and the socialist East camp, when 
countries at both camps, considered the economic policy of developing 
countries, especially those regarding the degree of state‘s intervention in 
economic affairs, dependent variable to changes in the political and 
economical international environment, and part of the game of the 
international balance.  (Al-Roubaiee, 2003). According to Myrdal 1968, this 
political pressure and interference produced two major categories of 
developing countries: 
A. The West camp allies, which contain the countries where liberal economic 
thought prevailed. Inside the countries of this camp, the private sector took the 
leading role in the process of economic development, and the free market 
mechanism was used, and state's intervening was partial. These policies resulted 
in forming a mixed economy were both public and private sector took roles. The 
public sector had the duty of providing the requirements of social capital as well 
as areas of production which surpass the investment's ability of the private 
sector. 
B. The East camp allies, which contain the counties where the socialist ideology 
played a major role in determining the size of state's intervention in the process 
of economic development. These allies gave the public sector a leading role 
towards the economy, and it used the central planning method to achieve the 
goals of economic development. These policies resulted in an expanding role for 
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the public sector and in a shrinking role for the private sector, especially in areas 
related to production activity and international trade.  (Myrdal, 1968) 
 
2.2 Public versus Private ownership in theory: advantages and disad-
vantages 
There have been great sum of literatures concerning the relativity of the ownerships of 
firms to their performance and efficiency. Even though most scholars favored private 
ownerships over firms, there has been a consensus over some positive elements 
regarding public ownership of firms. Most of these literatures were regarding issues like 
incentive scheme of managers, efficiency, corruption and control rights. Control rights 
however are extremely important in case of contingencies or in the case of incomplete 
contracts, where contracts between government and private firms are limited and 
government cannot regulate or specify its objectives clearly. These control rights are 
affected by difference in objectives between government and private owners.  Usually 
maximizing the profit is not the ultimate goal for government owned firms, the 
government has many other objectives like preventing monopolies, control quality, 
reduce negative externalities, encourage sectorial policies and national independence, 
and concentrate on investment and employment in recessions, these multiple objectives 
make it difficult for governments to contract upon.  (Roland, 2008)  
The following section will compare between public ownership and private ownership in 
terms of advantages and disadvantages.  
 
2.2.1 Advantages of private owned firms 
 Public ownership provides fewer incentives to monitor manager’s behavior, 
which allows managers to pursue personal agendas.  (Vikkers & Yarrow, 
1991)  
 Government owned firms are unable to commit to incentive scheme, which 
is considered as the source of inefficiencies. This will lead to two main 
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problems: The first one is the Ratchet effect; where managers avoid 
overfilling their production plans in order to avoid any future increase in the 
production’s target. The other problem related to government’s commitment 
is soft budgeting; a major reason for inefficiencies in public owned firm is 
that they can always rely on the state for financial support, as it is rarely for 
any government to leave a public enterprise goes bankrupted.  (Roland, 
2008)  
 Government of politicians might use government intervention to follow 
some private agendas. Such an intervention will be probably a source of 
inefficiency. Even though sometime, the state’s intervention can be 
necessary to prevent monopolies of price, new regulations can lead private 
firms to more loss-making and thus the negative effects will be greater on 
the social welfare as a whole. (Roland, 2008)  
 Assuming the efficiency of the market when stock market delivers true 
information on firms’ performance, this will carry information about the 
quality of managerial investments and will lead to more incentives for 
managers to maximize profit. (Laffont & Triole, 1993)  
 High government stakes in firms will tend to reduce market liquidity which 
will lead to less incentive to acquire information by the stock market 
participants. (Laffont & Triole, 1993)  
 In a government owned firm, managers cannot always be rewarded for 
critical cost reductions or profit maximizing decisions due the fact that 
government can use such an investment for alternative use than cost 
reduction or profit improvement. This will lead to strong incentive for 
managers to favor private firms, and that is why in the United States for 
example, the incentives schemes are controlled by shareholders and not by 
the government in the case of public utilities. The shareholders cannot agree 
on contract with government on all the details of managerial themes, and it is 
important for shareholders to use the innovation of their managers for such 
profit maximizing decisions. This superiority of private ownership will be 
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stronger when the government cannot reach to its goal of maximizing social 
welfare; a non-benevolent or corrupted government will most likely end up 
with a reduction of social welfare. (Laffont & Triole, 1993) 
 The threat of takeover or bankruptcy improve the managerial discipline at 
private firms, since takeover of public utilities are quite rare.                 
(Vikkers & Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis, 1991) 
2.2.2 Advantages of public owned firms 
 In the case of contingencies or incomplete contracts, the public ownership will 
be more useful because it will be able to impose socially desirable adjustments 
to the firms.  (Laffont & Triole, 1993)  
 A major point of difference between the government and private ownership is 
corruption. There have been many examples of corruptions scandals in transition 
economies when it comes to privatization, like in Russia, Czech Republic and 
Argentina. Even though public ownership cannot eradicate corruption but there 
has been a reduction in bribery when transitions has accrued from private to 
public ownership in most of the American cities. According to Glaeser (2001) 
Corruption can take a form of underpricing of inputs bought from government, 
overpricing of outputs sold to government and subsidies used to internalize 
externalities.  (Roland, 2008)  
 According to Shapiro and Willig (1990) and Schmidt (1990,1995) public 
ownership provide better information about firms for governments, which 
makes it not possible to a private firm to receive higher than necessary 
compensation to cover its cost or to receive the informational rent. However 
this may differ depending on how to view the government function. For 
example in a public owned firm the government is well acknowledged about 
the cost structure of the firm and will be always providing support for these 
costs in order to implement ex post efficient production levels. Which will 
lead to less incentives for managers to cut cost and thus to be more efficient, 
while on a private firm the case will be always to maximize profit by cutting 
more cost, and this in return can hurt the society in general, so 
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nationalization may be less efficient but may reduce allocative inefficiency 
also. (Laffont & Triole, 1993) 
 The conflict of interest that sometime happens between shareholders and 
regulators in private firms may produce less incentive for managers.            
(Laffont & Triole, 1993) 
 
2.3 Privatization in developing countries  
During the 80's of the previous century, developing countries had faced  major 
challenges for economic development, starting by  sharp increase in the levels of 
external debt, especially in the non-oil countries, sharp decrease in the rate of 
international trade with the continuing decline of the export's prices of primary 
commodity, high levels of deficit in balance of payments and of deficits in public 
budgets, decrease in the development of human resources as a result of high rates of 
poverty, sharp decrease of living standards associated with the decline in the rates of 
economic growth compared to the continuous rise in population growth rates, decrease 
in health and education levels, and ending by an increased rate of disguised 
unemployment, all these factors pushed some developing countries to rethink of the 
state role as a leader to the economy, even though there have been some achievements 
by the public sector regarding economic development.  (Al-Roubaiee, 2003) 
It was during these circumstances when privatization viewed as a magic solution for a 
major reform toward the inefficient state owned enterprises, and to prepare the path 
toward an expansion role for the private sector and during that time a major 
reconsideration of the state's role has been taken place in developing countries (Al-
Roubaiee, 2003). This support for a larger role for the private sector was due a common 
believe that privatization could decrease the level of unemployment and increase 
efficiency in state owned firms, also privatization could participate in decreasing the 
subsidies that the state owned firms are receiving from the state.  (Al-Roubaiee, 2003)  
In addition to the previous circumstances, Alessawi (1996) pointed for additional factors 
that supported such a shift towards privatization: 
   
  9 
 
1. .The collapse of the socialist system led by the Soviet Union. This collapse of 
the socialist giant and the low economic conditions of developing countries that 
adopted the method of central planning, considered as an evidence of the futility 
of the planning system, and as a necessity to move towards privatization and 
market economy.  
2. The multiple economic crises that faced large number of developing countries, 
which sought to get out seeking help from the advanced capitalist countries and 
international financial institutions, where these advanced economies and 
institutions, considered the recent transition to market economy, as the price for 
its help in the preparation, implementation and the financing of structural 
economic adjustment. 
3. The spread of Neo-Liberal ideas which have been pervasive due a variety of 
factors like: 
A. The victory of Neo-Liberal ideas on each of the Keynesian and Marxist 
ideas. 
B. The financial and technical support for developing countries that was 
provided by the advanced capitalist countries and international institutions 
notably the IMF and the World Bank, which implemented economic reform 
programs that contributed to an expansion of these Neo-Liberal ideas. 
C. The climate crisis experienced by the developing countries tempted to turn 
the idea into its opposite. So from the adoption of ideologies in the far left 
(the call for the development of central planning and the leadership of the 
public sector) to another in the far right (call for privatization and the market 
system) maybe as a despair of the routes addressed and as a hope that the 
new road with its gravity and its price magnitude will lead to the desired 
target.  
4. The attraction of the Asian model, which explained the success that came from 
its dependence on the market system and its openness to the global economy. 
Although the reality is that the development which occurred in this group of 
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countries, was led by the State, and the markets which were allowed to operate, 
were governed and directed by the State, and were subjects to its direct and 
indirect directives, and this means that the development process was taken 
through the leadership of the State to the market and not by market’s leadership 
to the development process.  (Al-Roubaiee, 2003) 
 
2.4 Privatization (Definitions) 
“The term privatization has two meanings the first: is a financial transaction-the 
sale of a publicly owned asset to the private sector. The second is the transfer of the 
authority to make resource allocation decisions from the government to the market 
place.”       (Gabel, 1987) 
“a generous stance would admit any transfer of ownership or control from public 
to private sector. A more exacting definition would require that the transfer be 
enough to give the private operators or owners substantive independent power. 
Transfer techniques can include trade sales to strategic investor, public offer, 
closed subscription joint venture, liquidation, concessions, auctions, voucher or 
certificate based transfers, employee or management buyouts or most combinations 
of all of these.”  (Donaldson & Wagle, 1995) 
“ privatization is the entire process of expanding the sphere of the market through a 
host of regulations that create an enabling environment for free enterprise to 
operate as a strategy for sustainable economic development.”  (Moyo & Njenga, 
1998)  
Privatization is broadly defined as the deliberate sale by a government of state-
owned 
enterprises (SOEs) or assets to private economic agents” (Megginson & Netter, 
2001) 
Based on the above definitions, privatization could be considred as a way to expand 
the role of the private sector into the economy, and a way to reduce the state’s 
intervention role in that economy, by offering more ownership and more control to 
   
  11 
 
the private sector over public owned firms. The selling of the state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) could be partial or full, and can take many forms and methods.    
 
2.5 Privatization around the world 
The first large-scale denationalization campaign was made by the Western Germany 
government of Konrad Adenauer in 1961, which it started by offering public shares 
of Volkswagen for mainly small investors, Volkswagen was followed few years 
later by VEBA a giant chemical firm. However the German experience during that 
time was not very successful. The first successful privatization campaign was made 
by Thatcher’s government in Britain during late 70's, the British experience is 
considered as the spark which started the spreading of privatization throughout the 
globe. The main common objectives for privatization according to Price 
Waterhouse (1989a; 1989b) are:  
 Raise revenue for the state. 
 Promote economic efficiency 
 Reduce government interference in the economy 
 Promote wider share ownerships 
 Provide the opportunity to introduce competition 
 Expose SOE's to market discipline. 
 (Parker & Saal, 2003) 
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2.5.1 Europe: 
The first massive public share offering was the British Telecom; the offering was met 
with a huge demand on the domestic scale and on the international scale as well. The 
$4.8 Billion shares sold to 2.25 million shareholders of investors and employees only in 
Britain, And later the large BT’s shares trading response in Japan and USA, were 
considered a positive signs for the future of privatization.     (Megginson W. , 2005) 
 The French privatization experience was very important to the global spreading of 
privatization, even though the French had a long history of state intervention in the 
economy, it didn't stop the massive privatization campaign to spread throughout the 
country. Until September 1986, over 22 major public company worth of $12 Billion has 
been sold in 15 months. A $7.1 billion initial public offering (IPO) of France Telecom 
and later a $10.5 billion seasoned France Telecom were considered as the largest IPO in 
the French history.  (Megginson & Netter, 2001) 
 In 1999 the electricity Italian company ENEL marked the largest IPO in the history of 
finance raising up to $18.9 billion for the Italian government, and that was only few 
years after the complete dismantle of IRI which raised up to $90 dollars to the Italian 
Treasury.  
(Megginson W. , 2005) 
2.5.2 Asia  
The Japanese giant NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) sat a new record of $15.1 
billion for IPO’s issue size; this offering could yield up to $188 billion of implied 
market capitalization for NTT. In 1988 the third tranche for NTT marked the largest 
security offering in history, $40.6 billion, and the three tranches of NTT could collect 
raise over $80 billion.  (Megginson & Netter, 2001) 
However the privatization process didn’t always take the form of IPO, most of the 
developing countries were selling the SOE straight to private firms or individuals in a 
step termed “asset sales”. During the 90’s China was the second largest economy on the 
basis of purchasing power parity. Even though during the 70’s the Chinese government 
launched a major liberalization campaign and economic reform, privatization was 
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limited. The reason for this was that there were relatively few outright sales of SOEs, 
and most of the privatizations that took place were on small scale. However this 
campaign could make a big influence on the productivity of the whole economy. 
Another major Asian country which adopted privatization was India which during the 
90’s considered to be the 5th largest economy on purchasing power parity. India had 
some similarities with China regarding the role of the state in leading the economy, and 
regarding the low performance of the state owned enterprises as well. Starting in 1991 
India lunched its privatization program and economic reform throughout the country.   
(Megginson W. , 2005) 
2.5.3 LATIN	AMERICA	
Soon after the British initials on privatization, a change of ownership started to be 
present in Mexico and Chile, where like many other countries, privatization started with 
the selling the state owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in competitive markets, and 
later the selling moved to the SOE’s in infrastructure or utility sectors. The pace of 
privatization was high comparing to other countries outside the OECD states, and the 
revenue raised was higher as well. During the 1990’s the privatization revenues 
averaged for a 6% of GDP in the Latin American states, any by the end of the decade, 
more than half of all Latin American privatizations were of high value infrastructure or 
utility firms. From 1991 to 2001 private investment in infrastructure in Latin America 
totaled $360.5 billion.  (Nellis, 2003)  
2.5.4 AFRICA 
However the term Privatization was not very popular between Western and South 
African countries, though it well existed on a small scale, according to Scholars, Nigeria 
was one of the most frequent sellers of state owned enterprises through initial public 
offering. Even though the South Africa government adopted nationalization themes, it 
sold several partial sales of state owned firms.  (Megginson W. , 2005)  
Privatization reached its peak in 2000 when the sum raised for governments by selling 
state owned firms reached $180 billion. The cumulative value of proceeds rose by 
privatizing governments, topped $1 trillion in the second half of 1999, and reached 
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more than $1.5 trillion in 2003.  Even though governments continued to follow 
privatization agendas, particularly in China, when the Chinese government offered 
stakes in its major oil companies; privatization slowed down due to the decline of stock 
markets of NASDAQ in March 2000. After the $180 billion record of 2000, 
privatization’s proceeds dropped to $51 billion in 2001, $69.2 billion in 2002 and $46.6 
billion in 2003.  (Megginson W. , 2005)  But still, this decline didn’t prevent countries 
like, Korea, Turkey, and Morocco from taking large steps in privatization. 
Privatizing speed was different in different regions. In general developed counties have 
raised higher revenue from privatization than developing countries. Between the years 
1977 and 2001The average of privatization revenue for each developed country 
was $43.2 billion (see table 3. appendix 4/4), while in each developing country the 
average was $7 billion (see table 2, appendix 3/4). And the proceeds of privatization of 
developed countries accounted for an average of 6% on GDP comparing to an average 
of 5% on GDP for developing countries. However Regarding the market value of 
privatized companies the fraction of GDP was rather similar 47.1% for developed 
countries and 40.06 for developing countries. Also the public offering of shares 
accounted for similar fraction of total proceeds 58.9% and 51.1% in developed and 
developing countries respectively.  (Megginson W. , 2005) 
 The biggest share of privatization proceeds came from Western Europe which 
accounted for 53% of the world privatization proceeds, Asia and Latin America came 
next with 15% each, Australia 8%, Eastern Europe 5%, and with Middle East, Africa, 
and North America with 2% only.(see Figure 2)  (Megginson W. , 2005) 
Regarding the industrial sector, Telecom was the most popular sector for privatization 
projects, between 1990 and 2000, Telecom offerings account for 36% of all proceeds 
raised, followed by power 16%, financial institutions 15%, and oil and gas accounted 
for 10% (see Figure 1). This data have reflected clearly on the SOE’s share on GDP in 
industrialized countries, when it started to decline since 1991 and reach below 5% 
recently. Low income countries have experienced a larger decline in SOE share of 
GDP from 16% in 1981 to 7% in 1995. The effect of privatization on transition 
economies of central and eastern European countries was huge due the size of state 
ownership in these economies.  (Megginson W. , 2005) 
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The European and the Japanese privatization experience were the most important to 
push the privatization wheel to role across the globe, and by the year 1995 dozens of 
countries has adopted enormous privatization programs, and particularly developing 
countries in Latin America, Africa and South Asia. 
 
2.6 General motives behind privatization 
There has been some consensus concerning the reasons behind government’s decision 
to adopt privatization. The present political and economic atmosphere of the country 
may provide strong tendencies towards privatization, also the political history of the 
country can play major roles also. However in this study, major seven reasons behind 
government’s motive to privatize will be discussed. 
 
2.6.1 Economic Development 
Recent studies show that privatization and GDP are related, and according to Colbert, 
economic development is initially led by the state due to its ability to accumulate the 
capital in infrastructures. However the state role will decline through privatization to 
lead the economic development process. It is important to say that the size of the state 
owned enterprise in a country, and the development level of a country play a major role 
to determine the size or revenue that has been generated by privatization. 
 (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004) 
2.6.2 Government budget constraints 
Deficit in government budget and the need to pay sovereign debts showed privatization 
as a magic solution to raise revenue for government instead of imposing tax increase or 
cuts on spending. Privatization also can relieve the governments from subsidizes to loss 
making SOEs. On the other hand the way of dealing with these revenues account for the 
success or the failure of the privatization process, as it showed in some developing or 
transition economies, despite that in the majority of cases privatization succeeded in 
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making strong impacts on the economy in general. While in Europe the need to pay 
public finances were a major motive behind privatization, in Latin America 
privatization motive was mainly to attract foreign investments and capital into the 
country. 
 (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004). 
2.6.3 Financial Markets: 
According to Levine and Zervos(1998) financial markets promote economic growth 
because of the market tendencies to favor  more efficient allocation of resources, 
however one of the most important element of financial market is liquidity due to its 
ability to facilitates diversification, information, aggregation, monitoring of managers, 
and regulation of firms(Bortolotti, Siniscalco, 2004).  Also liquidity is associated with 
privatization revenues in terms of “allowing a fuller extraction of a company’s market 
value from private investors by facilitating information aggregation”. Privatization wave 
peaked during high market’s performance in the 1990’s and usually it slows down with 
low stock prices. 
 (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004) 
2.6.4 Political majorities 
Even though some left-wing parties made huge privatization plans, like the Jospin’s 
government in France for example, most of the privatization campaign are designed and 
led by conservative and by right-wing or center parties in both developed or developing 
countries, however it is well known that leftist governments support more size for 
government role, while conservative or liberal are traditionally oriented towards the 
market economy. Judging by numbers, right-wing’s governments raised up to $16 
billion from privatization in their ruling time, while the left-wing’s government could 
only generate up to$ 10 billion from privatization. 
 (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004). 
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2.6.5 Legal Origin 
The country’s law play a vital role in prompting or discouraging privatization acts, 
whether a country follow a civil low or a common low, affects the size and the success 
of privatization projects. For example an average of SOE’s value added and SOE’s 
investment as a proportion of GDP for common law countries is roughly 12%, while it 
is 15% for French civil law tradition country, and 12% for German civil law tradition 
country. In general civil law countries have a larger sector of SOE than common law 
countries. Also it is more difficult to lunch a privatization campaign due the need to 
modify the constitution of that country like the Portuguese case in 1982 and again in 
1989 for example. The legal protection for investors is different between common law 
countries and civil law countries, and at the same time the SOE performance is different 
between the French civil law and the German civil law traditions. All these difference 
alter the result and the need for privatization. 
 (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004) 
2.6.6 Political institutions  
A major similarity between countries who adopted a large scale privatization is 
political majority at the parliament. In most of the cases, privatization faced a strong 
opposition from some political parties or from labor union. These opponents could 
in few cases stand successfully against some privatization projects. For example in 
Belgium 1990, a general strike led by trade union could stop the attempts of 
Martens’ government to privatize a large number of SOEs. A look at the British 
political life between 1985 and 1986 will show how the majority of the conservative 
parliament could push back the opposition and continue with their privatization 
agenda, despite a two year strike by the national union of mineworkers. 
 (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004). 
2.6.7 Efficiency  
Most scholars agree that privatization promote efficiency inside firms. And on the 
other hand there is increasing evidence that many SOEs are loss-makers rather than 
revenue generators. According to a study by the World Bank, state owned firms in 
   
  18 
 
developing countries accounted for one-quarter to one-half of all outstanding 
domestic debt and for a substantial portion of foreign policy. This inefficiency can 
be related for many reasons including: 
 Mismanagement, corruption, patronage and padded payrolls. 
 Inefficient operations, maintenance and service delivery.  
 Involvement in highly capital-intensive operations or investments with long 
payback periods. 
 Constraints on pricing policies by governments. 
 Overly restrictive government controls on the finances of SOEs. 
 Failure of central governments to provide promised subsidies in timely 
manner. 
 Government requirement that SOEs should take over failed privately owned 
businesses. 
 (Prokopenko, 1995)  
 
2.7 How to privatize 
Privatization is not a step; it is a long process and requires an effortless study and 
preparation before making a final decision to privatize. Giving the importance of 
existing enterprises for economic activity inside the economy, the method of selling 
SOE and converting them into a private enterprise is vital. However according to 
Megginson, it is required from the government before selling a state owned enterprise 
to: 
 Decide whether to restructure the state owned enterprise before sale. 
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 Find an acceptable and transparent method to value the company and to ask 
suitable price for it. 
 Decide whether or not to regulate a newly privatized company after it has been 
divested.  
(Megginson, 2005)  
While Gibbon (1997) pointed out the steps that are required by a government 
developing a divestment programs: 
 Setting up a structure for privatization, including legislation, if necessary. 
 Providing adequate performance records for the SOE which being sold 
(generating believable accounting data). 
 Developing any necessary new regulatory structures. 
 Determining the appropriate post-sale relationship between the firm and the 
government.  
(Parker & Saal, 2003) 
Based on that information the following steps are crucial in order to continue with a 
successful privatization plans:  
 
2.7.1 Choosing	the	right	sector	
Usually privatizations plans face a strong opposition from different segments, starting 
by politicians, bureaucrats within the government, and workers and managers of the 
state owned enterprises, which makes it vital for any government adapting privatization 
policy to choose very carefully the sector which the government intends to privatize.  
When a certain government takes a step toward privatization, this government is risking 
losing power or producing major problems to the economic reform which the 
government wanted to implement in the first place. 
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However different segments, shows different levels of oppositions, the current state of 
the economy play a critical part also. According to a study on privatization in Poland, 
Hungary, and Czech Republic by Borsnstein (1999), retail trade, consumer service and 
housing industries operate in sectors that are partly privatized in most of the countries, 
which makes it relatively easy for this sectors to be fully privatized. Agriculture is more 
difficult to privatize than the previous sector, while light industry usually need a 
substantial restructuring in addition to small capital investment due to its full state 
owned status. Starting by heavy industry, followed by banking, electricity and 
telecommunications, privatization become a very difficult task, due to the strategic 
importance of these sectors and because of the need of these sectors for foreign direct 
investment and for more and new regulations before it is privatized.  
(Megginson W. , 2005). 
2.7.2 Passing a privatization law 
However implementing effective regulations in developing or transition economies is a 
very difficult mission, simply because these countries suffer mostly from a poorly 
functioning legal systems, and they face a high opportunity cost of  losing experienced 
employees and staff.  But still, this regulatory mission is not an easy task at all even for 
advanced economies in the world. Once the decision on the sector for privatization has 
been made, a new law or legislation is needed to legalize the selling process. In many 
cases when privatizing a national or strategic industry (oil and gas production, surface 
transportation) a change in the constitution of the country is needed.  In most of the 
cases, a new legislation is made with each new privatization project, and eventually 
after many projects, an overall law for privatization will be made as a frame to all 
privatization processes in the country 
 (Megginson W. , 2005) 
(Seven, 2002) 
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2.7.3 Create	an	Administrative	body	
Due the fact that privatization process is large and complex, a new administrative 
agency will be created. This agency contain all the staff and skilled personnel who 
responsible on the process of the privatization from the very beginning. Some countries 
have given this responsibility to the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry for Industry 
while in most of the transition economies the case was creating a new ministry 
responsible over privatizations decisions and process. However in some examples a 
relatively small organization or agency with a significant authority and with a limited 
life span will be created to lead the privatizations process. The implementation of 
privatization also should be decentralized to banks, financial institutions or management 
consulting firms, or to the managers of the state’s enterprises themselves, with 
appropriate supervision by the national privatization agency. 
 (Prokopenko, 1995) 
2.7.4 Commercialization	of	the	state	owned	enterprise		
The next step in the privatization process is commercialization. Commercialization 
means the change of the objectives and the culture of the state owned firm. The new 
objective of the enterprise should be maximizing profit, and new operating private 
sector policies should be implemented. In another words, it is a change in the firm’s 
culture. However this is one of the most difficult tasks to be done. Many studies showed 
how difficult it is, to insert a new profit-oriented value into a work force of public-
sector employees, or to implement new systems of accounting, information processing, 
supply-chain management, and human resource management policies into the daily 
operating rhythms of state owned firms. For example the accounting system that is used 
in most of the transition economies is entirely different from the international 
accounting standards that are used in most non-transition countries. 
(Megginson W. , 2005) 
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2.7.5 Trade‐	off	between	state’s	objectives	and	valuing	the	SOE	
Normally governments are multi-objectives organizations, but when it comes to 
privatization, government objectives might carry a contradictions tendency, which 
makes it very critical step for any government to trade-off between objectives like: 
 Speed of sale versus revenue maximization and transparency. 
 Revenue maximization versus favoring citizens and ensuring domestic 
ownership. 
 Promoting economic efficiency versus preserving the SOE’s employment levels 
and maximizing political benefits for the government. 
 Promoting development of the national stock market versus divesting state 
assets rapidly and completely. 
 (Megginson W. , 2005) 
 
After selecting the objectives of the privatization process the government will face a 
very problematic difficult task, and that is valuing the asset it plans to sell. for example 
in most cases the current economic or financial state of state owned firm is not very 
tempting, but at the same time it carry a huge potential for profit making if the firm is 
running under private ownership. So the question would be: On which basis the state 
owned enterprise should be valued? Is it on its current state, or is it on its potential for 
the future?  However there are four basic methods for valuing a non-traded company for 
sales, these methods are: 
1. The earning capitalization approach, which is also known as the P/E ratio 
method. 
2. The discounted cash flow method. 
3. The market entry method (or determine the Tobin’s Q value for the company). 
4. The comparable-firm approach.  (Megginson W. , 2005) 
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2.7.6 Choosing	the	sale’s	methods:	
 Restitution: 
The first method is called Restitution, which can be performed by giving back specific 
property or land to its original owner or to the legal heirs of that owner. This property 
has been taken by the government from the original owner at some point back in 
time, due to political or economic reasons during that period. This method is primarily 
related to the political or the economic history of the country, and that is why it has 
been used mostly in Eastern European countries and it is rarely used outside that region. 
For example in Bulgaria restitution has covered 64.2% of all the houses, plots and yards 
that were claimed. The value of the returned property to their owner via restitution has 
reach 10.3 billion Levs, about 2% of GDP. (Drobniak,2008)(Iatridis,o.a.,1998) 
 
 Voucher: 
The second and the most controversial method is the mass privatization or the voucher 
method, which has been used mostly by the transition economies of eastern and central 
Europe. This method is preformed simply by giving citizen voucher which can be used 
to claim stakes at a state owned enterprise. These vouchers are giving for free or at 
minimal rates. (Drobniak, 2008). The voucher method has been used mostly in 
countries with a history of communism, where most if not all state owned enterprises 
were in bad shape, and a need for quick change to market economy was critical. And 
that makes sense why this method has been used in specific region, where countries in 
that region have some similarities in political background, despite large differences of 
the details and the time frame of the mass privatization programs used in each country. 
Even though the voucher method succeeded in privatizing a large segment of the 
country's SOE, it produced many impediment and problem for the whole privatization 
program and mostly it brought negative results. These results were due numerous 
reasons:  
 The emergence of the new owners or the insiders who were mostly the mangers 
or the employees of the divested state owned firm. These new owners gained 
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massive controls over the divested enterprise and provided them with less 
incentive to restructure it.  
 The short inflow of cash to both the firm and the government. 
 The intervention tendencies of the government into some important or strategic 
SOEs. 
 The massive control of the banking sector by the government, despite a large 
privatization campaign in other sectors of the economy. 
 (Megginson W. , 2005)  
 Asset’s Sale:  
The third method is selling the state property for cash, and it takes two main forms. The 
first form is direct trade sales (trade sales) of state property to a certain investor or for a 
certain corporation, and this form is usually used for a relatively small state's assets. 
Even though 40% of privatization in developed countries and 47.3% of privatization in 
developing countries was done by using trade sales, the revenue of these privatizations 
was much lower than the revenue generated from share issue privatization (SIP).  Direct 
sale is considered tempting for foreign investors, and it allows the government to ensure 
that the strategic SOEs are between domestic hands, and it provides the government 
with the opportunity to term the sales in order to reach social or political objectives. 
However this form is still unable to provide large sales proceeds for the state, also direct 
sale has a negative impact on the national stock market, and due to its complexity and 
non-transparency, direct sales are an easy target for corruption.  The second form of 
state property's sale called share issue privatization SIP which can provide large sums of 
cash for the government and it is usually used for big state owned enterprises. SIP is 
usually done by selling the state for its property through a public share offering. Even 
though this form of sales considered costly and require a lot of time, it can generates 
huge sums of money for government and it provide the government with an opportunity 
to term the sales to reach social and political objectives as well. However an important 
feature for SIP is transparency. 
 (Megginson W. , 2005)  
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2.8 Privatization in developing regions 
Between 1988 and 1995 privatization revenue in developing countries topped $132 
billion, with more than 3800 transfers of control from public to private hands. The 
revenue from selling state owned enterprises increased from $20.6 billion in 1988 to 
reach over $21 billion in 1995, with the exception of the year 1992 when the revenue 
peaked over $26 billion. Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Hungary, China and 
India were the highest developing country privatization revenues between 1988 and 
1995. The number of developing countries adopting privatizations plans has increased 
from 14 in 1988 to 60 countries in 1995. Latin America contributed for most of the total 
revenue earned with 51%, followed by East Asia 21%, and Europe and Central Asia 
18%. (Organization, 1998)  
The following section will provide some statistics on some majore privaizing 
developing counties around the world. 
 
 
2.8.1 Latin America: 
Ranked as the Fourth in the world in terms of number of privatization transaction and 
third in terms of revenue, Latin America witness 424 sales transaction in 13 years 
period with revenue’s worth over $109 Billion. Brazil, Argentina and Mexico stand for 
most these transactions and revenues. These three countries stand for 75% of total 
revenue and 53% of transaction. 45% of the revenue came from utilities, energy, 
industry and credit. The average percentage of stock sold is 58%. The predominant 
sale’s method in Latin America is direct asset sale. 
 (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004)  
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2.8.2 Africa (Sub-Saharan):  
Sub-Saharan Africa is ranked the last in the world in terms of revenue and Second last 
in terms of transaction. 143 privatization programs had been conducted since 1986 with 
revenue’s worth 7.3 billion, which account for 0.6% of the world’s total only. South 
Africa and Nigeria stand for 56% of total revenue and 34% of total transactions. 
Between 1988 and 1992 the predominant method of sale was public offering, while 
after 1996 the predominant method of sale was direct asset sale. Almost 50% of the 
transactions were in agriculture and industry sector. The average percentage of stock 
sold is 55% (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004) 
 
2.8.3 North Africa and Middle East (MENA): 
Privatization in MENA is practiced on a small scale, with 149 transactions generated 13 
billion. Egypt and Israel stand for 69% of total transactions and 49% of total revenue. 
32% of total deals in MENA were in the financial sector. Public offering and direct 
asset sales are the predominant methods in the region.  (Bortolotti & Siniscalco, 2004)  
2.8.4 Asia 
From 1985 to 2001, 448 transactions have taken place in Asia with a revue’s worth 
$296 Billion. Telecommunication generated the most revenue while transportation 
account for the most deals. The average percentage or shares sold is 42%  (Bortolotti & 
Siniscalco, 2004) Revenues raised from South Asian economies between 1991 and 2005 
totaled 24 billion, out of which Bangladesh contributed 132 million, Sri Lanka 878 
Million, and Pakistan 7,4 billion.  (Roland, 2008) 
 
3 EMPIRICAL PART 
 
The empirical part of this study will be divided into two parts. The first part is an 
interview with an expert. The interviewee will be discussing and answering a set of 15 
questions regarding privatization prerequisites, methods and review the privatization 
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experience in developing countries. The expert is Mr. Arto Honkaniemi, a Senior 
Financial Counselor at the Ownership Steering Department at the Prime Minister's 
Office. The interview has taken place at Mr, Honkaniemi’s office at the Ownership 
Steering Department and it lasted for more than one hour.   
The second part will be referring to three major international studies on the performance 
of newly privatized firm. These studies have measured the performance of firms by 
measuring the change in certain variables after divestiture. The main data used for these 
studies are the annual reports and the sales prospectus of the newly privatized firms. 
These measured variables are; profitability, efficiency, capital investment, employment, 
output, leverage, and dividend. The studies have been conducted over 107 firms in 25 
countries, 13 of these countries are ranging between little-income and middle-income 
developing countries. However the author of this research will focus on the finding 
regarding firms operating in developing countries. 
3.1 The interview 
 
Who is Arto Honkaniemi?  
“Mr. Arto Honkaniemi, M.Sc. (Econ.), B.Sc. Econ., LL.M. has been the Industrial 
Counsellor of Ministry of Trade and Industry, Finland since 1998. Mr. Honkaniemi 
serves as Senior Financial Counsellor at Ownership Steering Department of the Prime 
Minister's Office, Finland. He has held several positions at Yrityspankki Skop Oy in 
both Finland and Luxemburg from 1989 to 1998, Senior Legal Counsel for 
PerusyhtymÃ¤ Oy from 1976 to 1989 and Company Lawyer at Arila Oy from  1974 to 
1975. Mr. Honkaniemi also served as General Manager at KiinteistÃ Oy Casa 
Academica from 1971 to 1974. He served as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
Finnish Export Credit PLC from 2003 to 2004. Mr. Honkaniemi has been Director at 
Metso Paper, Inc. since 2008, and Alko Oyj since 2007. He serves as a Board Member 
of Patria Oyj and Alko Inc. He served as a Director of Kemira Growhow Oyj from 2004 
to October 22, 2007, Outokumpu Oyj from 1999 to 2006 and Partek Corp. from 1998 to 
2002. He served as a Director of Metso Corp., since April 2, 2008. He served as a 
Director of Metso Minerals Oy since 2008. Mr. Honkaniemi served as Member of the 
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Board of Directors of Destia Oy from 2008 to 2009 and Solidium Oy since 2004. Mr. 
Honkaniemi also holds Master of Laws and Master of Science (Economics and Business 
Administration)” 
 (Bloomberg BusinessWeek) 
What is the Ownership Steering Department? 
“Duties relating to state ownership steering are handled in the Ownership Steering 
Department in the Prime Minister’s Office. The department is responsible for state 
ownership policy, the ownership steering of state-owned companies under the Prime 
Minister’s Office, expansion of ownership base, branch reorganizations, share 
investments, coordination of ministries' ownership steering procedures and 
interministerial cooperation.”   (Ownership Steering Prime Minister Office) 
 
3.1.1 Discussion 
 
It is important to note at the beginning, that each country has its own circumstances, 
these circumstances could be economical, political, or cultural, and they will have a big 
influence on the motives behind privatization, methods used, and the impact of the 
privatization on the economy. So it is quite difficult to draw a guidelines or method of 
privatization that would apply for all countries. Before privatizing a state owned 
enterprise in a certain country, a look at the history of the state owned enterprises in that 
country should be considered, in order to find the reasons behind the existence of such 
enterprises in the first place, and why these enterprises are owned by the state. Each 
country had its own economic and political circumstances that contributed to the 
creation for these public firms. Before start any privatizing plans, the economy should 
be divided into sectors, and the company that will be chosen for privatization should be 
the one which is seen as the most feasible for such a project. For example, a state owned 
company which is already competing with private enterprises could be considered as a 
natural candidate for privatization, but on the other hand if the company is operating in 
a strategic sector, like energy, maybe it is not considered as the best choice for 
privatizing. The criteria for choosing the firm or the sector to be privatized, is depending 
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on the state motives or objectives behind privatization, and it is very important to 
choose a company that would flourish and perform much better under private 
ownership. The ultimate goal for the state behind privatization should be to improve the 
sector or the company which is going to sell. There has been some bad example for 
privatization in Africa during the 90’s, where a number of privatization projects have 
taken place in Africa, after being recommended by the World Bank’s experts, and the 
results were negative due picking the wrong company or the wrong industry for 
privatization, or due having the wrong motive to privatize. The state should choose the 
right policy before privatizing, is it going to start a mass privatization program, or is it 
going to privatize partially, and decide whether it will adapt a long term privatizing 
program or whether it is going to privatize by taking each firm on its own. Also the state 
should decide on a policy to remedy some of the possible side effects of privatization, 
like for example laid off employees. Concerning the developing countries, there have 
been some common reasons behind the failure of the privatization plans, like political 
interference, corruption, and picking up the wrong company or sector for privatizing, 
where the chosen firm or sector was not in a sufficient shape to be able to function well 
or prosper under private ownership. When a company is going to be privatized, certain 
actions or steps should be taken:  
 The firm should preferably have a corporate form under the general low of 
corporate form that is applied in the country like limited liability company   
 The company should probably capitalized in order to survive in a less 
advantages economic circumstances,  
 It should have a well-equipped board of director with no political interference, 
professional management, and optimal personnel. 
And in order to reach a proper privatization results, major prerequisites for privatization 
should be exist:  
1. Majority of political support to the privatization plans.  
2. Absence of government interference.  
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3. A transparent and public ownership policy of the state, regarding the state 
owned firms.  
4. The company which is going to be privatized should be well-chosen, and 
prepared in order to sustained under private ownership.  
5. The transaction to the private ownership should be transparent and no corrupt. 
6. The new ownership of the enterprise should be proper and honest.  
7. A common companies’ law that all firms can follows, should be existed or 
legislated.  
8. A creation of ownership or privatization department, which works as a 
transparent public state organization, with the proper legal framework that 
should be applied for both public and private companies.  
 
3.2 Multinational studies: 
 
“Major study by Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (MNR henceforth) compares 
the pre- and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 firms from 18 
countries (12 industrialized (OECD) and 6 developing (non-OECD)), and 32 industries 
over the 1961-1990 period.  
“Boubakri and Cosset (1998) consider a large set of newly privatized firms (79) 
headquartered in 21 developing countries that experience full or partial privatization 
over the period 1980 to 1992. Their sample covers a wide range of DCs in terms of 
development level and capital market sizes.” 
“D’Souza and Megginson (1999) compared the pre- and post-privatization financial 
and operating performance of 85 companies in 28 countries and 21 industries that were 
privatized through public share offerings for the period from 1990 through 1996. Out of 
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these 85 companies, 58 of the firms are from 15 industrialized countries and 27 from 13 
developing countries.  
(Boubakri & Cosset, 1999) 
 
3.2.1 The financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms: An 
international empirical analysis  
By Megginson, William L., Robert C. Nash and Matthias van Randerborgh, l994 
Magginson, Nash and Randerborgh led a study which compared the performance of 61 
privatized companies from 18 countries, before and after privatization, and also between 
32 industries, 6 of the sampled countries are listed as developing and 12 listed as 
developed countries. These companies have been privatized through a public share issue 
only. The variables which observed in this study are: Profitability, Efficiency, Capital 
investment, Output, Employment, Leverage, and Payout.  The study is using Wilcoxon 
signed-Rank test as a principal method of testing the significant changes in the 
variables. And also the study is using a proportion test to determine whether the 
proportion P of firms experiencing changes in a given direction is greater than would be 
expected by chance (typically P=0). The finding of the test is divided between the 
results of the complete 61 firms’ sample, and the results of the subsamples which are: 
privatization of firms in competitive versus noncompetitive industries, full versus partial 
privatization, and privatization involving firms headquartered in developed (OECD) 
versus less developed countries. However the focus will be on the results regarding 
privatization impacts in firms operating in developing countries. 
 
 Profitability: 
The profitability has been measured with three ratios, return on sales ROS, return on 
assets ROA, and return on equity ROE. According to ROS and ROA and ROS profita-
bility increased significantly after privatization with the ROS is the strongest. The mean 
increased in ROS 2.49 percentage points (1. 40 points) after privatization, and 69.1% of 
all firms tested have experienced an increase in the profit margin after privatization. The 
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statistics for this test are all significant at the 1% level. The ROS is also improved for 
the firms operating in both OECD and developing countries. (At the 5 or 1 percent lev-
el) 
 Efficiency: 
The efficiency will be measured by employing inflation-adjusted sales per employee 
(SALEFF) and net income per employee (NIEFF). For the full sample sales per em-
ployee went from a median of 95.6% before privatization to 106.2 after privatization. 
The net income per employee increased by a mean of 25.1 percentage points (17.7 per-
centage points). Both SALEFF and NIEFF increased in 85.7% and 69.7% of all firms 
respectively, and both increases are significant at 1 and 5 percent levels respectively.  
However the efficiency measured by SALEFF and NIEFF ratios, increased insignifi-
cantly in developing countries  
 Capital Investment Spending: 
Using the capital expenditures divide by total assets CETA shows an increase in capital 
investment relative to sales by 5.21 percentage points (1.59 percentage points) and 
67.4% of all cases increased CESA after privatization. The Wilcoxon and proportion 
test statistics (2.35 and 2.44) are significant at the 5 percent level. On the other hand the 
CETA measure is insignificant to both Wilcoxon and proportion tests. When it comes to 
developing countries, the study was not able to draw a strong conclusion due the low 
number of observation for CESA in developing countries; however the study showed 
that Capital investment spending does not decrease in developing countries.  
 Output: 
The real sales increased for both Wilcoxon and proportion tests after privatization sig-
nificantly, the change is significant at the 1 percent level for both measures. The median 
increased in real sales from an average level before privatization to real sales after pri-
vatization is 24.14 percentage points (19.02 points), before privatization the average of 
sales level were 89.9 percent (89.0 percent). And 75.4 % of firm tasted showed an in-
crease, including companies in developing countries.  
 Employment: 
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The most surprising results were concerning employment, where it increased by a medi-
an of 2.346 employee (276 employees) after privatization. The Wilcoxon test is not sig-
nificant at conventional levels, but the proportion test is significant at the 10 percent 
level. The employment levels increased in 64.1% of all firms.  
 Leverage: 
Using a total leverage measure, total debt to total assets LEV, and a long term debt to 
equity LEV2 the results showed a significant decline in leverage for both ratios. In LEV 
the median declines in 2.43 percentage points (2.34 percentage points) and in LEV2 
52.88 percentage points (16.68 points). At least 70% of all firms decreased their lever-
age ratios after privatization. The leverage measured by LEV declined significantly in 
developing countries.  
 Dividends: 
Whether it is measured as a total dividend payments divided by net income PAYOUT 
or dividends divided by sales DIVSAL, an increase is shown after privatization. The 
median of PAYOUT increased 23.31 percent (20.09 percent) of profits to 45.87 percent 
(37.58 percent) after privatization and the mean increase in payout of  22.55 percentage 
points (12.48 points) is significant at the 1 percent level. The payout increased in 70% 
of all firms tested. On the other hand the measure of DIVSAL showed that the mean 
increased in dividends as a fraction of sales, 1.72 percentage points (1.21 points) is sig-
nificant at the 0,001 percent level, and fully 89.7 % of all firms increased DIVSAL after 
privatization. DIVSAL increased significantly also in developing countries and the rest 
of the subsamples after privatization 
 Conclusions: 
 Privatization resulted in the following impacts on firms: a significant increase in 
profitability, output per employee (adjusted for inflation), capital spending and total 
employment, dividend payout, and a decrease in leverage. These results were 
unchanged when compared industrialized and developing countries privatization. 
However the improvement of privatization was greater on companies which 
   
  34 
 
experienced a 50% or greater turnover in directors than companies with less dramatic 
change in director after privatization. 
 (Magginson, Nash, & Randenborgh, 1994)     
 
3.2.2 The financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms: evi-
dence from developing countries.  
Boubakri, Narjess and Jean-Claude Cosset, 1998 
This study was conducted on a sample of 79 newly privatize firms in 21 developing 
countries, the developing countries mentioned in these studies are different in their level 
of development and capital market size. The sample of firms selected includes low 
income economies like Bangladesh and Pakistan, lower middle income economies like 
Chile, Thailand, and upper middle income economies like Argentina and Malaysia. The 
firms selected have been privatized through public share issues and through direct sale 
to another company. The variables that have been used in this test are: profitability, 
efficiency, capital investment, output, employment, leverage, dividend policy. The two 
tailed Wilcoxon-signed rank test will be used in testing the significant changes in the 
variables in addition to a proportion test to determine whether the proportion P of firms 
experiencing a change in a given direction is greater than what ought be expected by 
chance, typically testing whether P=0.5. In addition to the full sample there will be a 
measure for subsamples of: Total privatization versus partial privatization, firms 
operating in a competitive environment versus firms operating in noncompetitive 
environment, control privatization versus revenue privatization, upper middle income 
countries versus lower middle income countries.  
 
 Profitability: 
The profitability will be measured by return on sales ROS, return on assets ROA and 
return on equity ROE ratios. The return on sale mean went from 4.93 percent (4.60 
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percent) before privatization to 10.98 percent (7.99 percent) after privatization. This 
significant increase at 1 percent level is achieved by 63% of the sample firms.  
 Efficiency: 
The efficiency will be measured by sales efficiency (real sales per employee) and net 
income efficiency (net income per employee) ratios.  The sale efficiency ratio mean 
increased for raw at one percent level and market adjusted at 5 percent level after 
privatization, and this increase is achieved by 80% and 75% of firms respectively.  
 Capital investment: 
Measuring the capital investment will be by employing two ratios, the first is capital 
expenditures divided by sales CESA and capital expenditures divided by total assets 
CETA. The test resulted in an increase in both of the ratios after privatization, both for 
raw and market adjusted data. Capital expenditures ratio increased on average from 
10.52 percent (0.93 percent) to 23.75 percent (3.62 percent). This increase is achieved 
by 62 percent of the unadjusted firms and 64% or the market adjusted firms. 
 Output:  
An increase in the output has been documented in both unadjusted (at the 1 percent 
level) and market-adjusted firms (5 percent level) for 76% and 64% of tested firms 
respectively. 
 Employment: 
Employment increased significantly at the 10 percent level according to the unadjusted 
results, while when we adjust the employees for market effects, employment increased 
significantly at 5 percent level. The market adjusted increase in employment is on 
average 139(601) employees for 58 percent (67 percent) of the sample firms.  
 Leverage: 
The measuring ratios will be total debt to total assets and long term debt to equity ratio.  
The increase is significant at the 5 percent level in debt to assets ratio and in the long 
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term debt to equity ratio for the unadjusted data. The median decline in the total debt to 
total assets was 5.08 percentage points (1.62 percentage point) and in the long term debt 
to equity ratio was 44.15 percentage points (5.74 percentage points). 63% and 65% of 
all firms experienced such a decrease. 
 Dividend payout: 
Both dividend to sales ratio and dividend payout (dividend payments divided by net 
income) have increased for unadjusted data and for market adjusted data. The median of 
unadjusted dividend to sales ratio increased from 2.84 percent (0.89 percent) before 
privatization to 5.28 percent (3.05 percent) after privatization. 76% and 68% of the full 
sample distributed more dividends as proportion of their sales using unadjusted and 
market adjusted data respectively. 
 Conclusion: 
After comparing the pre-privatization to post-privatization data, this study concluded 
that privatization succeeded in influencing the full sample. Both unadjusted and market-
adjusted results showed significant increases in profitability, operating efficiency, 
capital investment spending, output (adjusted for inflation), total employment and 
dividends. And the results showed a significant decrease in leverage for the unadjusted 
leverage ratios. The subsamples showed a similar results as well, where a strong 
performance improvement has been documented for all the subsamples; however the 
improvement of performance were stronger in the middle income developing countries 
than low income developing countries. 
(Boubakri, o.a., 1998) 
 
3.2.3 The financial and operating performance of privatized Firms during the 
90’s  
Juliet D’Souza and William L. Megginson 
This is a study of 85 newly privatized firms from 28 countries and 21 industries, where 
58 of these firms are from 15 industrialized countries, while the rest of 27 firms are 
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from 13 developing countries. These firms have been privatized through public share 
offering between1990-1996. The variables tested in this study are the same of previous 
studies, which are: profitability, efficiency, capital investment, output, employment, 
leverage, and dividend payout. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test will be used as the 
principal method of testing a significant changes in the variables, also another 
proportion test will be used to determine whether the proportion P of firms experiencing 
changes in a given direction is greater than would be expected by change (typically 
testing whether P=0). In addition to the full sample a number of subsample will be 
tested, these subsamples are: firms from competitive versus firms from noncompetitive 
industries, control privatization versus revenue privatization. Firms from developed 
versus firms from developing countries, firms with less than 50% post-privatization 
change in the firm’s board of directors versus firms with a 50% or greater change in 
board of directors, and firms which change their CEO after privatization VS firms that 
do not. 
 Profitability: 
Measured by ROS and ROA ratios, profitability increased significantly after 
privatization for the full sample. The mean increase in ROS after privatization is 3.0 
percentage points (3.0 points), from 14 to 17 percent of sales, this result apply for 71% 
of all firms. Wilcoxon test showed that ROS, ROA increased significantly at the 1 
percent level after privatization, while the change in ROE is insignificant. However 
when it comes to less industrial countries, the profitability increased insignificantly 
according to both the Wilcoxon test and the proportion test.  
 Efficiency: 
The measuring ratios for efficiency will be the inflation-adjusted sales per employee 
SALEFF and net income per employee NIEFF. According to both measures the median 
increased significantly for all the sample firms. Sales per employee increased from a 
median of 102 percent (87 percent) before privatization to a median of 123 percent (116 
percent) after. While net income per employee went from a median of 62 percent (71 
percent) before to 132 percent (137 percent) after privatization. SALEFF and NIEFF 
increased in 79 and 76 % of all cases, both significant at the one percent level 
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respectively. Efficiency improved after privatization in firms operating in developing 
countries as well, with all changes significant at the 1 percent level. 
 Capital investment: 
Investment intensity will be measured by CESA (capital expenditures divided by sales) 
and CETA (capital expenditures divided by total assets), and according to both 
measures, no significant decrease in spending has been found, and these including all 
subsamples except firm in industrialized countries. 
 Output: 
Changes in output will be calculated by comparing the average inflation-adjusted sales 
level before and after privatization. The median increased in real sales from the average 
level during three years prior to divestiture to the average level afterwards is 176 
percentage points (111 points) and 88% of the full sample firms, showed an increase in 
real sales. A significant increase in real sales is experienced for all the subsample 
groups. 
 Employment: 
Employment change will be calculated by examining the average employment levels for 
3 years period before and 3 years period after divesture. The Wilcoxon test showed an 
insignificant median decrease in employment of 805 employees (770 employees) after 
privatization. The proportion test statistics showed a significant decline at the 5 percent 
level, with 64% of firms experienced declining employment levels. The significant 
difference between subsamples is that privatized firms from industrialized country 
reduce employment more than do firms from non- industrialized countries. 
 Leverage: 
Measured by total debt to total assets, a significant decline in leverage is documented 
for the full sample of privatized companies. The median decline in total debt to total 
asset is 6.0 percentage points (8.0 percentage points) with 67% of all firms experienced 
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a decrease in leverage. The leverage decline is experienced in the subsample of 
developing countries as well. 
 Dividend payout: 
Measured as cash dividends divided by sales revenue DIVSAL, the median dividend 
payment increased from 1.5 percent (0 percent) of sales before divestiture to 4 percent 
(2 percent) afterwards, and the median increased in payments of 2.5 percent (2 percent) 
is significant at the 1 percent level. DIVSAL increased in 79% of all cases. The 
dividends improved via the subsamples as well. 
 Conclusion: 
The study documented a significant increase in the mean and median level of 
profitability, sales, efficiency and dividend after privatization. Also the study 
documented a significant decrease in mean and median leverage ratio, insignificant 
decreases in the mean and median employment level, and insignificant decrease in mean 
and median capital investment ratios. However the subsample of unindustrialized 
countries resulted in a significant increase in output, efficiency and dividend, with a 
significant decline in leverage, but the increase in profitability was insignificant in firms 
operating in unindustrialized countries. 
 (D’Souza & Megginson, 1999) 
 
4 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The findings of this study are presented in two parts. The conclusion of the interview 
with an expert will be answering the first part of the research questions of this study; 
while the findings of the three major international studies regarding privatization 
impacts over firms, will be answering the second part of the research questions of this 
study.  
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As the interview with Mr. Honkaniemi suggested, a certain conditions should be existed 
in order to insure the success of the privatization, these conditions are:  
1. Political support. 
2. No government interference. 
3. Transparency of the policy toward SOEs, like the motives behind privatization, 
and the reasons behind choosing a certain company or sector. 
4. Proper prepare for the divested SOE in order to sustain in the future. 
5. Transparency of the selling method. 
6. A trusted and well-chosen buyer for the SOE. 
7. A common company’s law that could be followed. 
8. A separate independent department that can be responsible over the transaction 
and over privatization in general. 
Regarding the preparation of the divested SOE, these important steps should be taken: 
1. A provision of corporate form to the divested SOE. 
2. A proper capitalization for the divested SOE. 
3. A provision of well-equipped management with no political interference, and 
with optimal personnel.  
These finding answers the first part of this research’s questions, “what are the general 
steps that can be taken or the conditions that should be available in order to insure the 
success of privatization?” 
 The three major studies that have been chosen as a reference for this thesis showed that 
privatization have a general positive impact on firms’ performance in developing 
countries. The samples of the previous three studies examined 107 companies from 25 
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countries, 13 countries from low-income and middle-income economies and 12 from 
upper-income economies, and all of the studies measured the impact of privatization on 
the firm performance by commuting the change in mean of certain variables after 
divesture, these variables are profitability, efficiency, capital investment, employment, 
leverage and dividend. However the privatization impacts on firms are generally 
positive and improved the firms’ performance, and these findings answers the second 
part of our research’s questions, “what are the impacts of privatization on firms in 
developing countries?” 
 In the First study conducted by Megginson, Nash, and Randerborgh, Profitability, 
output, and Dividends increased significantly for the privatized firms in developing 
countries, and at the same time, Leverage declined significantly for firms operating in 
developing countries. However the increase in efficiency is insignificant for privatized 
firms operating in developing countries. In the second study conducted by Boubakri and 
Cosset, Profitability, output, employment, and dividends increased significantly for all 
newly privatized firms in developing countries. However the efficiency increased 
significantly for upper middle income developing countries only. In the third study led 
by D’Souza and Megginson, profitability, efficiency, output, and dividend increase 
significantly for privatized firms operating in developing countries, while capital 
investments increased insignificantly and leverage declined significantly. The surprising 
result of the last study is that employment rate declined after privatization. However the 
decline is insignificant, and this due the fact that one third of D’Souza, Megginson 
firms’ sample are from regulated utilities (electricity and telecommunication firms). 
As a conclusion of the three previous studies, and as the interview with Mr. Honkaniemi 
suggested, Privatization is not an easy process, it require multiple conditions, and it 
takes many steps to implement it, and to ensure its success. Privatization requires well 
planning, reconstruction of the public firm that is going to be privatized, a non-corrupt 
government, and an appropriate political atmosphere. And at the same time, the state 
should provide the legal and administrative frame for privatization. On the other hand,   
privatization had major positive impacts over firms’ performance in developing 
countries. Privatization could improve profitability, output, and dividends for all the 
firms operating in developing countries, and at the same time privatization could 
decrease the leverage for all the firms in developing countries as well. Regarding 
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efficiency measured by ROS (return on sale), ROA (return on asset), and ROE (return 
on equity), the increase in the performance was insignificant. Privatization succeeded in 
improving the employment rate significantly for two of the previous studies. Another 
crucial point to be added to our conclusion is that both, the development stage of the 
country, and the type of privatized sector in the industry, have a vital role in deciding 
the size of impacts of privatization over firms’ performance in general.  
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Figure 1 Sectoral Breakdown of privatization Proceed 
Source:  (W. Megginson) 
   
  45 
 
15 %
53 %
15 %
2 %
5 %
8 % 2 %
Asia
Western Europe
Latin America
Middle East &
Africa
Eastern Europe &
FSU
Australasia
North America
 
Figure 2 Geographic Breakdown of Privatization Proceeds 
Source:  (W. Megginson) 
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Figure 3 Privatization around the world by transactions (1977-2001) 
Source :  (Bortolotti and Siniscalco) 
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APPENDIX 1/4 
 
1. What could be considered as major reasons for a government to privatize? 
2. What are the most important prerequisites for privatization, in order to be suc-
cessful? 
3. What are the major steps that governments should take before starting its privat-
ization plans, in order to achieve the maximum result? 
4. How do governments privatize? And what methods are commonly used? 
5. What do you think is the best and most efficient privatizing method? Why? 
6. Do you recommend any specific privatizing method for all countries, especially 
developing countries? 
7. Do you recommend privatization as a way for economic development in devel-
oping countries? Why? 
8. What do you think of privatization impacts in some developing countries in 
Asia, Africa or Latin America? 
9. There have been some disastrous results after privatization plans in some coun-
tries, what do you think were the major reasons behind that results? 
10. What do you think a developing or emerging economy should do as major steps 
before starting its privatization projects? 
11. What sector or industry should be privatized first? Why? 
12. Do you recommend privatization for some strategic industries, like power for 
example? 
13. Do you think a major reform or restructure for state owned enterprises could re-
place privatization as a solution for inefficiency? 
14. How important is the political factors behind privatization? 
   
  48 
 
15. Some states sold their full or majority stakes in SOEs, while others decided to 
keep most of the stakes, which solution would be more suitable for developing 
countries? 
 
APPENDIX 2/4 
 
Company Country Date $ Millions Fraction 
Sold (%) 
Times Offer 
Subscribed 
First Day 
Return (%) 
# Shareholders 
Created, mln 
Volkswagen Germany Mar 1961 315 60% 2 103,3% - 
British Petroleum UK Jun 1977 972 17 4,7 22,7 - 
British Aerospace UK Feb 1981 339 51,6 3,5 14,0 - 
British Telecommu-
nications 
UK Nov 1984 4,673 50,2 9,7 86,0 2,25 
British Gas UK Dec 1986 8,012 100 4,0 23,0 - 
Banque Paribas France Jan 1987 2,740 100 40,0 18,5 3,81 
Nippon Telegraph Japan Feb 1987 15,097 12,5 6 55,0 - 
British Petroleum UK Oct 1978 12,430 31,4 <1,0 -21,5 - 
Nippon Telegraph Japan Nov 1987 40,260 12,5 - 3,1 - 
Conrail U.S.A Mar 1989 1,650 85 >1 10,3 - 
Telefonos de Chile 
(ADR) 
Chile Sep 1990 89 - >1 7,4 - 
Telefonos de Mexico Mexico May 1991 2,170 14,8 >1 0 - 
Deutsche Telekom Germany Nov 1996 13,300 26 5 19 2+ 
French Telecom France Oct 1997 7,080 23 3 15,0 3,91 
ENELl Italy Nov 1999 18,900 34,5 Heavily 0 3,8 
PetroChina China Apr 2000 2,3890 10 - -4,7 - 
Statoil Norway Jun 2001 2,900 20 - 0 - 
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Bank of China China Jul 2002 2,800 - - -4,7 - 
Saudi Telecom Saudi 
Arabia 
Jan 2003 3,700 30 - - - 
        
        
 
 
 
Table 1 Historically Significant Share Issue Privatization 1961-2003 
Source:  (W. Megginson) 
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Country Deals Revenue Rev/GDP Stock PO/Deals 
Argentina 77 3.2485,16 0.11 0.78 0.17 
Uruguay 2 38.08 0 0.77 0 
Chile 24 3.195.35 0.04 0.7 0.38 
Malaysia 33 6.622.95 0.06 0.67 0.33 
Brazil 76 33113.27 0.04 0.68 0.22 
South Africa 14 2.987,70 0 0.59 0.21 
Mexico 67 22.055,61 0.06 0.84 0.07 
Venezuela 45 11.156,06 0.14 0.82 0.09 
Turkey 28 5.636,27 0.03 0.69 0.18 
Thailand 24 5.275,78 0.03 0.54 0.63 
Peru 66 5.265,56 0.09 0.86 0.05 
Colombia 16 4.423,53 0.05 0.55 0.19 
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Jordan 3 590.46 0.07 0.36 0 
Ecuador 1 44.76 0 0.67 0 
Egypt 64 2.007,02 0.03 0.37 0.8 
Philippines 16 312.83 0.02 0.61 0.06 
Indonesia 16 312.83 0.02 0.61 0.06 
Zimbabwe 6 71.63 0.01 0.56 0.83 
Pakistan 14 2.205,00 0.03 0.71 0.07 
India 25 2.283,01 0 0.43 0.44 
Kenya 14 109.41 0.01 0.56 0.43 
Nigeria 20 10.478,17 0.33 0.42 0.95 
 
Average 
 
29 
 
7.089,02 
 
0.05 
 
0.61 
 
0.31 
 
 
Table 2 Privatization in some developing countries (1977-2001)  
Source: World Bank Development Indicator (Bortolotti and Siniscalco) 
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Table 3 Privatization in Developed countries (1977-2001) 
Source: World BANK Development Indicator (Bortolotti and Siniscalco)
Country Deals Revenue Rev/GDP Stock PO/Deals 
Switzerland 6 7,014.30 0,02 0,54 0,50 
Japan 17 187,708.40 0,03 0,15 1,00 
Denmark 7 3,533.31 0,02 0,66 0,71 
Norway 29 7,979.26 0,05 0,64 0,45 
Austria 47 9,597.65 0,04 0,65 0,57 
Germany 151 77,752.34 0,03 0,79 0,13 
Finland 55 18,404.17 0,11 0,59 0,40 
U.S.A 38 12,519.94 0,00 0,97 ,034 
Sweden 51 18,970.51 0,07 0,77 0,22 
Netherlands 28 18,763.94 0,04 0,59 0,39 
Belgium 15 6,657.09 0,02 0,53 0,20 
France 97 58,633.64 0,03 0,68 0,55 
Singapore 25 3,308.30 0,03 0,54 0,64 
Ireland 14 5,811.79 0,06 0,64 0,29 
Hong Kong 19 11,187.14 0,07 0,49 0,47 
Australia 131 58,054.89 0,13 0,93 0,07 
Canada 57 11,439.49 0,02 0,81 0,32 
UK 215 133,635.28 0,10 0,91 0,33 
Italy 113 98,275.28 0,08 0,63 0,38 
Spain 88 48,626.92 0,08 0,63 0,38 
New Zealand 42 7,697.39 0,11 0,88 0,10 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
